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BALANCING PROFIT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY IN ECUADOR: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM THE CHEVRON CASE
NATHALIE CELY†
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the people of Ecuador ratified the first national constitution in
the world to enshrine the Rights of Nature.1 As one of the most biodiverse
countries in the world, this was more than a symbolic gesture; it reflected a
national consensus that our whole approach to protecting the environment–
including ourselves–must change and adapt if we are going to make this
planet a place where all can live freely and safely.2
Ecuador had a vested interested in taking the unprecedented step of
providing constitutional rights focused on nature because so much is at
stake in our country. The inclusion of these rights of nature in the
Constitution is given in four articles (art. 71 to 74) and expresses the deep
respect with which we regard our environment. The articles state that
“Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and realized, is entitled to
its existence, maintenance and regeneration of its vital cycles, structure,
functions and evolutionary processes are fully respected. Any person,
community, village or nationality may require the public authority to
enforce the rights of nature . . . The State will encourage natural and legal
persons and groups to protect nature, and promote respect for all the

Copyright © 2014 Nathalie Cely.
† Nathalie Cely is the Ambassador of Ecuador to the U.S. Previously Her Excellency served as
Ecuador’s Coordinating Minister of Production, Employment and Competitiveness. The ideas
presented in this paper are the sole responsibility of its author. It does not purport to represent the views
of the Republic of Ecuador or the official position of its Government.
1. National Constituent Assembly, Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (Oct. 20, 2008).
2. Kintto Lucas, Ecuador: New Constitution Addresses New Demand for “Plurinational”
State, INTER PRESS SERVICE (May 5, 2008), http://www.ipsnews.net/2008/05/ecuador-new-constitutionaddresses-demand-for-lsquoplurinationalrsquo-state/; Ecuadorian Assembly Approves Constitutional
Rights for Nature, CLIMATE & CAPITALISM (July 10, 2008), http://climateandcapitalism.com
/2008/07/10/ecuadorian-assembly-approves-constitutional-rights-for-nature/;
Cyril
Mychalejko,
Ecuador's Constitution Gives Rights to Nature, OP ED NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.opednews.com/articles/2/Ecuador-s-Constitution-Giv-by-Cyril-Mychalejko-080925102.html.

353

Cely Macro - Author Proof (Do Not Delete)

12/4/2014 7:11 PM

354

[Vol. XXIV:353

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

elements that form an ecosystem.”3 It clearly reflects the deep commitment
by Ecuador that the country has elevated this issue to a constitutional level.
Since the enactment of the Constitution, the National Assembly adopted the
Law Amending the Law on Mining, Water Management Act,
Environmental Law and Development.4
But we did not arrive at this conclusion easily; the path to get to where
we are today was long, litigious, and costly on many levels. For decades,
transnational corporations took advantage of our country’s institutional
weakness as related to the public sector and of lax international standards
for business compliance with human rights protections and regulations.
Irresponsible extraction of natural resources, inadequate methods of
remediation, and lack of financial compensation for victims of corporate
irresponsibility harmed not only human life but also the environment.5
Arguably the most egregious example is that of Texaco-Chevron’s
almost 25-year operation in Ecuador. During its operations in Ecuador,
Texaco-Chevron knew they were using technologies that were sub-par
compared to the more advanced environmentally friendly technologies
used in the United States.6 The American Petroleum Institute issued
minimum standards for oil exploitation7 before Texaco-Chevron
commenced its operations in Ecuador, the oil company chose to ignore
those guidelines in order to make greater profits. Beginning in the 1960’s, a
consortium of oil companies led by Texaco (which agreed to merge with
Chevron in 2001 to become ChevronTexaco Corp. then later Chevron
Corp.8) extracted oil and dumped toxic waste in our Amazon rainforest
using methods and technology that were obsolete and non-environmentally
friendly, contrary to the technologies used by Chevron in other parts of the

3. Nathalie Cely & Gustavo Dominguez, The Challenges of Attracting Foreign Direct
Investment for Latin America’s Sustainable and Diversified Economy: Lessons Learned From Ecuador,
46 http://nathaliecely.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/english-03-14-2014.pdf (last visited April 6, 2014).
4. Id.
5. Christie Smythe, Ecuador Judge Testifies to Taking Bribes in Chevron Case, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Oct. 24 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-23/ecuador-judge-testifies-to-takingbribes-in-chevron-suit.html; Ecuador, Chevron and Pollution: Justice or Extortion?, ECONOMIST (May
21, 2009), http://www.economist.com/ node/13707679; Yoon Sung-won, `Will Texaco people drink this
water?',
THE
KOREA
TIMES
(Dec.
23,
2013),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www
/news/culture/2013/12/316_148470.html; TRUE COST OF CHEVRON, THE TRUE COST OF CHEVRON: AN
ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL REPORT 36 (2011), http://truecostofchevron.com/2011-alternative-annualreport.pdf.
6. History of Texaco. CHEVRON CORP., http://www.texaco.com/about-timeline.aspx (last visited
Apr. 6, 2014).
7. CENT. COMM. & DIV. OF PROD., AM. PETROLEUM INST., DRILLING AND PRODUCTION
PRACTICE: 1963 (1964).
8. CHEVRON CORP., supra note 6.
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world.9
Lack of experience, weak institutions, and the absence of international
obligations mandating minimum compliance requirements for business
practices that respected human rights in hydrocarbon exploitation made
Ecuador deeply dependent on external technological expertise for the
design and construction of infrastructure that would facilitate the
extraction, transportation, and sale of Ecuadorian oil on the global
market.10 This provided considerable advantages to transnational
companies over the State during what was initially referred to as the “oil
boom.”11 These legal, technical, operational, and administrative advantages
made the country totally dependent on large transnational corporations;
Ecuador needed their technical expertise and subsequent transfer of
knowledge.
Oil companies ostensibly took advantage of this relationship
dynamic–the case of Texaco being a major example. Ecuador’s relationship
with Texaco provided many lessons for Ecuador and the world in a number
of different fields, particularly on investment treaties, human rights,
international relations, business ethics, international law, and international
arbitration. For example, it is possible to prove, through documents
obtained thanks to the Freedom of Information Act12, the extent and force
of Chevron’s lobbying and public relations efforts to exert pressure on
United States government institutions with the purpose of influencing from
human rights reports to the commercial relationship between the two
countries. These lobbying efforts have been detrimental to the bilateral
relationship between the United States and Ecuador.
When Texaco left Ecuador, significant profits in hand, it left
unprecedented damage to the environment and no compensation to those

9. Compare id. (according to Acuerdo Ministerial No. 621, 1992, discharging produced water
and mining fluids in open-air pits has been legal in Ecuador since 1992), with NAT’L PETROL. COUNCIL,
MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCED WATER FROM OIL AND NATURAL GAS WELLS, 10 –11, 16 (Sept. 15,
2011), http://www.npc.org/Prudent_Development-Topic_Papers/2- 17_Management_of_Produced_
Water_Paper.pdf (recognizing that, in the United States, operators managed 92% of produced water by
deep mine injection, by 1985). See generally Steven Levitsky & Victoria Murillo, Continuity and
Change in a Weak Institutional Environment (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Columbia
University).
10. See, e.g., Judith Kimerling, Oil, Contact, and Conservation in the Amazon, 24 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL L. & POL’Y 43, 46, (2013) (attributing Ecuador’s dependence on foreign markets and expertise
as undermining the country’s institutions).
11. The Oil Boom and the Military Dictatorship, QUITO, http://www.quitoadventure
.com/ecuador-info/history/ecuador/oil-boom.html (last visited April 6, 2014).
12. Ted Folkman, Chevron, Lobbying, and Lago Agrio, LETTERS BLOGATORY (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://lettersblogatory.com/2013/10/04/chevron-lobbying-lago-agrio/.
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affected in its wake.13 For more than a decade, a group of indigenous
plaintiffs from the affected rainforest region were embroiled in a legal
battle with Texaco-Chevron.14 Despite a legal labyrinth that stretched from
Ecuador, to New York, to California, back to Ecuador, Canada, Brazil,
Argentina and even The Hague, Chevron still refuses to pay any court
awarded damages won by the plaintiffs—which currently stand at close to
$9.5 billion.15 Instead, Chevron has waged a dangerous and unprecedented
international campaign to escape responsibility, including filing three
arbitration proceedings against the Government of Ecuador and
undermining both Ecuador-US bilateral relations and the international
Bilateral Investment Treaty framework.
Ecuador has grown and learned much from these experiences. We
have set out on an irreversible path towards a stronger and more inclusive
democracy with solid institutions that protect all, including vulnerable
indigenous populations and the natural environment.
Where the
international community has lagged, we have stepped up and created our
own framework to protect our environment and set standards for
responsible and sustainable economic growth and development.
Ecuador further realizes that our country’s efforts alone cannot
sufficiently address the need to transform investment treaties and
arbitration mechanisms for sustainable development and productive
transformation. We seek to bring together stakeholders from around the
world, including the United Nations, other concerned countries from our
region as well as Europe, Africa, Asia, and key civil society voices in order
to establish a global set of fair minimum standards and regulations that will
hold transnational corporations accountable when they invest and obtain
reasonable profits. We aim to place the promotion of social and
environmental justice on an equal footing with corporate profits.
I would add, As this paper will show, we know and have proven that,
13. William Langweische, Jungle Law, VANITY FAIR (May 2007), http://www.vanityfair
.com/politics/features/2007/05/texaco200705.
14. Cely & Dominguez, supra note 3, at 15; Chris Mondics, Chevron Fights Case that Led to
$19B Ruling in Ecuador, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Oct. 29, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-1029/news/43465461_1_steven-donziger-patricia-hamill-chevron-corp; Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638
F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011).
15. Paul M. Barrett, Ecuadorian Court Cuts Chevron's Pollution Bill in Half, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-13/ecuadorian-courtcuts-chevrons-pollution-bill-in-half; Paul M. Barrett, Chevron Inches Closer to Legal Victory Over
Ecuador Pollution, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 19, 2013). See Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger,
768 F. Supp 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing litigation commenced by Chevron against lead
plaintiffs’ attorney claiming RICO violations); Chevron v. Donzinger Post Rico Trial News Coverage,
AMAZON PRESS (Jan. 13, 2014) (noting that likely court victory for Chevron would “neutralize” prior
damages award in Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron).
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if done right and responsibly, corporations, governments, peoples, and
nature can live peacefully and prosper symbiotically.
I. RIGHTS OF NATURE – “BUEN VIVIR”
An inadequate institutional framework and a chain of errors in
economic policy decision-making during this critical period—starting from
the discovery of oil in the country in 1967 through the new millennium—
left Ecuador in a precarious and unsustainable position by the early
2000’s.16 Poverty was high, infrastructure was old and failing, and the
social safety net for citizens was minimal and not inclusive. Ecuador
needed drastic structural changes, strong leadership, and deep and
sustainable reform to modernize its economy, society, and democracy17
With this in mind, in November 2006, the people of Ecuador elected
economist Rafael Correa President of the Republic.18 His message of
change and support for health, education, employment, housing initiatives–
essentially the creation of a new country–resonated deeply among
Ecuadorians.19
Upon first taking office, President Correa proposed to convene an
assembly to write a new constitution, a proposal that was overwhelmingly
supported in a national referendum.20 A Constituent Assembly was
convened and it approved a draft text for a new constitution; the proposed
constitution was then put to popular referendum and won the support of the
Ecuadorian people by a large margin.21
16. See JOHN D. MARTZ, POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR 230 –31 (1987).
17. See Levitsky & Murillo, supra note 10, at 9, 24 (noting the institutional instability of
Ecuadorian governance since the transition to a multi-party democracy from a military junta in the late
1970s).
18. Estadísticas Presidenciales (Segunda Vuelta), HOY.COM http://www.hoy.com.ec
/votebienec/p20062.html (last visited April, 6 2014); Correa "Nuevo Presidente de Ecuador", BBC
MUNDO
(Nov.
29,
2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_6194000
/6194034.stm.
19. Daniel Schweimler, Ecuador Elige Romper con el Pasado, BBC MUNDO (Nov. 27, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_6187000/6187088.stm; Kintto Lucas, ElectionsEcuador: Correa Set to Win (But Perhaps not This Sunday), INTER PRESS SERVICE (Oct. 6, 2006),
available at http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/10/elections-ecuador-correa-set-to-win-but-perhaps-not-thissunday/.
20. Ecuadorian Assembly Approves Constitutional Rights for Nature, supra note 2; Ecuadorian
President Correa Calls March National Referendum, MERCO PRESS (Jan. 15, 2007),
http://en.mercopress.com/2007/01/15/ecuadorian-president-correa-calls-march-national-referendum;
Rosa Rodriguez, Ecuador: President "Stabbed in Back" by Church Over Constitution, INTER PRESS
SERVICE (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ipsnews.net/ 2008/08/ecuador-president-stabbed-inthe-back-by-church-over-constitution/.
21. Haroon Siddique, Ecuador Referendum Endorses New Constitution, GUARDIAN (26 Sept.,
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The new constitution, adopted in 2008, was the first in Ecuador’s
history to guarantee the right of “buen vivir” which literally translates to
“good living”.22 “Buen vivir” encapsulates the vision of the Quechua
peoples of the Andes who call it “sumac kawsaw” and refers to a way of
living that is community-centered and respectful of the environment.23 It is
based on a belief that it is the responsibility of each individual to promote
and protect the health of the overall community and that all who live in a
community assume their full responsibilities and reap its many benefits.
Importantly, the new constitution was also the first in the world to
establish the Rights of Nature, declaring that “Nature, or Pacha Mama,
where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its
existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles,
structure, functions and evolutionary processes. All persons, communities,
peoples and nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of
nature. . . The State shall give incentives to natural persons and legal
entities and to communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all
the elements comprising an ecosystem.”24
Ecuador had a vested interest in taking this unprecedented step
because so much was at stake in our country. Ecuador is considered one of
the most biodiverse countries in the world and is ranked by the Convention
on Biological Diversity as one of the 17-mega diverse countries on the
planet.25 In terms of conservation, the country is divided into four natural
geographic regions containing 3 of the world’s 10 most biodiverse areas.26
Ecuador is home to the Galapagos National Park, a UNESCO world
heritage site, and the Yasuni National Park, a 982,000 hectare stretch of the
Amazon rainforest that has more species of frogs, toads, and trees than all
of the continental US and Canada combined. 27
While these new constitutional provisions promoting “buen vivir” and
the Rights of Nature were the impetus for many other never-before-seen
initiatives and reforms, not all of them succeeded. In 2007, Ecuador
announced its support for an innovative international proposal in which
2008), http://www.theguardian.com/global/2008/sep/29/ecuador.
22. Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador , arts. 71–74 (2008).
23. ACOSTA ET AL., EL BUEN VIVIR. UNA VÍA PARA EL DESARROLLO 7–18 (2009).
24. Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, art. 71 (2008).
25. Ecuador Country Profile, Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.cbd.int/
countries/profile/default.shtml?country=ec (last visited Feb 19, 2014).
26. Margot S. Bass et al., Global Conservation Significance of Ecuador’s Yasunı´ National Park.
5 PLOS ONE 4, 7 (2010).
27. Id.; UN/Ecuador Agree on Trust Fund to Protect Bio-diversity from Oil Industry,
MERCOPRESS (Aug. 7, 2010), http://en.mercopress.com/2010/08/07/un-ecuador-agree-on-trust-fund-toprotect-bio-diversity-from-oil-industry.
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Ecuador would sacrifice billions of dollars in order to avoid the
exploitation of oil in a small section of the Yasuni, in exchange for less
than half of Ecuador’s lost revenue through international contributions.28
Despite gaining the support of the United Nations Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon and establishing a partnership with the United Nations
Development Programme, in August 2013, after several years of failed
attempts to secure sufficient international support, the Government of
Ecuador announced the decision to drill for oil in an area of around 0.01%
of the Yasuni.29 However, this time, any exploration and extraction will be
done in complete compliance with the Rights of Nature as declared by the
Ecuadorian National Assembly in its resolution to commence drilling. The
resolution states that “faced with the environmental impacts caused by the
exploitation of these resources, the State will put in place the most effective
mechanisms to achieve the restoration as well as the appropriate measures
to eliminate or mitigate adverse environmental consequences.”30 From this
drilling, Ecuador expects to receive approximately $19 billion, which will
be used to fight poverty, primarily in the Amazon region, which historically
has been neglected and excluded from the oil revenues derived from the
exploitation of its territory.31
The Constitution approved in 2008 has several articles related to the
management of the incomes from natural resources: First, it establishes
environmental protection as a priority. Second, it also establishes that, from
that income, there are set funding assignments to determined sectors such
as health, education, research, science and technology innovation, among
others.32 To clarify, the 2008 Constitution already has articles that predetermine where the funds from this income will be used; this assignments
of funds to help mitigate poverty does not depend on executive action.
Therefore, while these revenues will not be seen until long after the current
Administration is no longer in power, they will help ensure a positive and
sustainable future for our citizens and indigenous people.
28. UN/Ecuador Agree on Trust Fund to Protect Bio-diversity from Oil Industry, supra note 27.
29. Resolución que declara de Interés Nacional la explotación de los Bloques 31 y 43, en una
extensión no mayor al uno por mil de la superficie actual del Parque Nacional Yasuní [Resolution that
declares that the exploitation of Blocks 31 and 43, extending no greater than 0.01% of the current area
of the Yasuni National Park, is in the National Interest.] NAT’L ASSEMBLY OF ECUADOR (October 3,
2013) available at http://www.asambleanacional.gov. ec/acuerdos-y-resoluciones-tabla.html.
30. Id.
31. A Volcano Erupts: Rafael Correa Lambasts Us and “the Empire of Capital”, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21587825-rafael-correa-lambasts-us-andempire-capital-volcano-erupts.
32. Simón Cueva & María Ortiz, BANCO INTERAMERICANO DE DESARROLLO, Ingresos Fiscales
por Explotación de Hidrocarburos en Ecuador, available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/
wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=38065261.
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Despite the failure of the international community to support this
proposal, the inclusion of the Rights of Nature in our Constitution has
received a tremendous response within Ecuador.33 Between 2008 and 2013,
the National Judicial Council recorded 1,164 cases filed in connection with
crimes against nature, of which 550 have been settled and 614 are pending
settlement.34 The latest 2013 figures show 570 cases, of which 278 have
been resolved.35
The international community took notice of Ecuador’s stand to protect
the Rights of Nature and the importance of enshrining the commitment to
environmental protection in law. Since 2008, Bolivia, Turkey, Nepal, and
New Zealand as well as various US municipalities in Pennsylvania36, New
Hampshire, and California37 have written protections of nature and the
environment into their constitutions and local ordinances.
II. CHEVRON V. ECUADOR
To fully understand what led Ecuador to become the first country to
adopt the Rights of Nature in its Constitution, it is necessary to understand
the country’s complicated history with oil, which has been both a blessing
and a curse. From the beginning, this relationship was shaped and driven
by the country’s relationship with Texaco (now owned by Chevron). The
Ecuador-Texaco relationship began in 1964 when the Government of
Ecuador invited the Gulf Oil Corporation and Texaco Inc. to conduct
exploration operations in eastern Ecuador.38These multinational
corporations formed a consortium in Ecuador with equal shareholder rights
to conduct their operations and Texaco remained the sole operator for the
entirety of the partnership.39 The consortium discovered oil in 1967 and
33. Joshua Partlow & Stephen Kuffner, Voters in Ecuador Approve New Constitution,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Sept.
29,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/09/28/AR2008092802644.html.
34. National Judiciary Council of the Republic of Ecuador, Office of the President, Estadísticas
Relacionadas Con Delitos Contra La Naturaleza (unpublished data sheet, on file with the Duke
Environmental Law and Policy Forum).
35. Id.
36. Rights of Nature, CHAIKUNI INST., http://chaikuni.org/permaculture-in-the-amazon/rights-ofnature/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
37. An Ordinance of the City Council of the City of Santa Monica Establishing Sustainability
Rights, SANTA MONICA, CA (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://www.smgov.net/departments/council/
agendas/2013/20130312/s2013031207-C-1.htm.
38. Lucien Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Mandatory Grounds for the Non-Recognition of
Foreign. Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 4
(2009), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/trans national/vol19_1/dhooge.pdf.
39. Id.
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began exporting in 1972 after constructing a pipeline to Ecuador’s northern
Pacific coast.40 TexPet, a Texaco subsidiary, became a minority partner in
the oil consortium in 1977, yet remained the only oil operator in
approximately 500,000 hectares of Ecuador’s Amazon rainforest.41 TexPet
operated all three hundred fifty-six wells that were drilled and it is
estimated that more than 800 pits were excavated to bury the sludge and
contaminated material produced in the drilling process.42 Millions of
gallons of toxic material (waste water and produced water43) were dumped
into the rivers proximate to the oil well operations.44
Texaco, for cost and convenience, used a toxic removal system that
ravaged the Ecuadorian Amazon and brought considerable damage to
human life, flora, fauna, aquatic species, etc.45 Texaco did not use this same
remediation system in the US because it wished to avoid the consequences
of using such a polluting system in a developed country with proper rules
and standards for business compliance with human rights, health and
environmental protections.46 During the period when Texaco was
responsible for oil exploration and exploitation, it not only ignored the
American Petroleum Institute’s extensive guidelines and recommended
techniques for remediation issued in 1963,47 but it also failed to use the
remediation system the company itself had patented and which was
considered the latest technology at that time.48
Two types of litigation have resulted from Texaco’s almost 25 yearpresence in Ecuador and the devastating exploitation practices it employed
in the country. The first type of litigation began over 20 years ago and
involves only private parties, where those directly harmed (citizens of the
local ethnic groups and Amazonian settlers) brought legal claims against
Texaco and then against Chevron once it purchased Texaco.49 The second
type of litigation involves arbitration claims filed by Chevron against
Ecuador, i.e., as in an investor-state relationship, even though Chevron

40. Id.
41. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility of the Republic of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco’s Footprint on the World (November 2013), http://www.serpajchile.cl/web/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/Folleto-explicativo-espa%C3%B1ol-La-Huella-de-Chevron-Texaco-en-elMundo.pdf.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Dhooge, supra note 38, at 6.
46. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Human Mobility of the Republic of Ecuador, supra note 41.
47. CENT. COMM. & DIV. OF PROD., supra note 7.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Dhooge, supra note 38, at 10, 14.
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never invested in Ecuador, and the U.S.-Ecuador Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) under which the claim was brought only took effect five years
after Texaco left the country.50 The Court of International Arbitration
declared its jurisdiction retroactively, an unprecedented decision in
international investment arbitration.51
It should also be noted that in a New York court in 2004, Chevron
sued the Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, Ecuador’s state-owned oil
company filing the first arbitration against Petroecuador.52 Chevron alleged
that Petroecuador was subject to the clause under the Joint Operation
Agreement, which required that non-operator parties should compensate
the operator for any judgment against the operator related to its activities as
operator. U.S. courts denied this claim.53 Chevron appealed this ruling and
litigation continued through the appellate court system until the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to hear the case and affirmed the judgment of the
lower courts.54 Texaco attempted to hide its responsibility as the sole
operator in the region by asserting that technical and operational decisions
made at the time were done so solely through the consortium under the
JOA.55
The first attempt to seek justice by affected private parties began in
1993 in the U.S. District Court for the Second District of New York and is
known as the Aguinda case, in which seventy-four Ecuadorians represented
more than 30,000 inhabitants in eastern Ecuador.56 The plaintiffs sought:
Compensation for damages.57
Judicial protection to remedy the pollution and
contamination of the environment.58
(iii) Compensation for personal injury and property caused by
pollution.59
(i)
(ii)

50. Lise Johnson, Case Note: How Chevron v. Ecuador is Pushing the Boundaries of Arbitral
Authority, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/case-notehow-chevron-v-ecuador-is-pushing-the-boundaries-of-arbitral-authority/#_ftn1.
51. Id.
52. Wailin Wong, US Court Stops Chevron Arbitration Vs State-owned Petroecuador, CHEVRON
TOXICO (Jun. 20, 2007), http://chevrontoxico.com/news-and-multimedia/2007/0620-us-court-stopschevron-arbitration-vs-state-owned-petroecuador.
53. Id.
54. Aguinda v. Texaco Inc, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
55. Id.
56. Complaint at 19, Aguinda v. Texaco Inc, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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For nearly 10 years, these civil plaintiffs battled unsuccessfully in the
New York court.60 Chevron argued that the proper venue to decide the
claims was the Ecuadorian court system, and presented numerous affidavits
from Ecuadorian lawyers attesting to the capability of Ecuador’s courts.61
The District court found that under the principle of forum non conveniens,
the case should be returned to be heard in Ecuador but not without first
assuring that Chevron would agree to submit to the Ecuadorian courts with
an implicit recognition of the country’s judicial system’s capacity to
resolve complaints filed against the company.62 This ruling was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York.63
After Chevron won its motion to move the case to Ecuador, the civil
plaintiffs decided to file a suit in Lago Agrio, Ecuador, where they sought
the same environmental remediation raised in the Aguinda case in New
York.64 In general, the plaintiffs’ petition65 called for the elimination or
removal of pollutants that continue to threaten the environment and the
health of residents including:
(i)

The removal, proper treatment, and disposal of
contaminated material and waste that are kept in crude oil
wells.66
(ii) The cleaning of rivers, estuaries, lakes, wetlands, and
natural and artificial streams.67
(iii) The cleaning of land, fields, crops, roads, and buildings that
may still be contaminated by waste from Texaco’s
operations.68
(iv) Design and implementation of a medical monitoring plan.69

60. Dhooge, supra note 38, at 56.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 44.
63. Id. at 10 n. 58.
64. Id. at 56.
65. Ecuador Legal Complaint, CHEVRON TOXICO (2003), http://chevrontoxico.com/assets
/docs/2003-ecuador-legal-complaint.pdf.
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 478-480 (2d Cir. 2002); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., no.
93 Civ. 7527, 1994 United States. Dist. LÉXIS 4718, in *2 (S.D.N.Y.. April 11, 1994); Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627 (Southern District of New York 1996) (citing Sequihua v. Texaco,
Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994)); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998);
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2dos 534, 539-554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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On February 7, 2011, after a seven-year trial, Ecuadorian Judge
Nicolas Zambrano found Texaco-Chevron liable for pollution caused in the
area in question and determined the payment by Chevron as follows:
(i) $600 million for groundwater remediation.
(ii) $5.396 billion for soil remediation.
(iii) $200 million to restore the flora, fauna, and native aquatic
life.
(iv) $150 million to implement a system of drinking water in the
affected areas.
(v) $1.4 billion to establish a health care system for the
population of the affected areas.
(vi) $800 million for a health plan that includes potential cancer
treatment.
(vii)$100 million to rebuild ethnic communities and indigenous
cultures.70
The Judge also ordered the defendant to issue a public apology or pay
double the amount of the compensation award.71 Chevron refused to issue
an apology and the award was consequently increased to almost $19
billion.72
The Zambrano decision was ratified by an appeals court, and later by
the National Court of Justice, which affirmed the decision, but reversed
punitive damages, and on November 12, 2013, ordered Chevron to pay
US$9.5 billion.73
On December 23, 2013, Chevron’s lawyers submitted an
extraordinary action of protection before the Constitutional Court of
Ecuador, through which the oil company seeks to annul the National Court
of Justice’s latest ruling. The oil company must now prove to the court that
due process or other recognized rights were violated, by act or omission

70. David v. Goliath: An Update on the $19 Billion Judgment in Ecuador Against Chevron,
CHEVRON TOXICO (2013), http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2013-david-v-goliath.pdf; see also
Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco, Case No. 2003-0002 1, 179-183 (2011),
available at
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-02-14-Aguinda-v-ChevronTexaco-judgement-English.pdf.
71. Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco, Case No. 2003-0002 1, 186 (2011), available at
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-02-14-Aguinda-v-ChevronTexaco-judgement-English.pdf.
72. David v. Goliath, supra note 70, at 2.
73. Ecuador’s Highest Court vs. a Foreign Tribunal: Who Will Have the Final Say on Whether
Chevron Must Pay a $9.5 Billion Judgment for Amazon Devastation?, CHEVRON TOXICO (Dec. 2,
2013), http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2013-12-11-public-citizen-bit-analysis.pdf.
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under the Ecuadorian Constitution.74
III. THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2006–2011)
In December 2006, Chevron entered a notice of arbitration against the
Government of Ecuador based on the Ecuador-United States Bilateral
Investment Treaty, arguing that the Ecuadorian courts violated the treaty
signed by Ecuador by not resolving seven commercial cases that Texaco
had argued against the Republic in early 1990’s, related to the consortium’s
operations.75 The International Arbitration Court assumed jurisdiction on
December 1, 2008 and a partial ruling was issued on March 30, 2010
whereby the court determined that Ecuador had breached Article II (7) of
the Investment Treaty and was responsible for the damage to Chevron.76
The International Arbitration Court ruled on August 31, 2011 in favor
of granting Chevron approximately $96 million plus interest.77 The court
agreed that the 15-year delay in resolving commercial cases constituted a
breach of the treaty. It also concluded that the Ecuadorian judicial system
was neither corrupt, unfair, nor had acted with bias against Chevron.78
IV. THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2009 – PRESENT)
On September 23, 2009, 17 months before the Ecuadorian courts
reached any final judgment in the plaintiffs’ trial in Lago Agrio, Ecuador
was notified of a third arbitration proceeding before the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague requested by Chevron, according to the
arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), and as per the terms of the BIT.79 Overall, Chevron
alleged denial of justice, unfair and inequitable treatment, and

74. Alexandra Valencia, Chevron Appeals to Top Ecuador Court in Pollution Case, REUTERS
(Dec. 23, 2013 6:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/23/us-chevron-ecuadoridUSBRE9BM0V020131223.
75. Interim Award in Chevron-Texaco Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL 53 (Inv,
Treaty Arb. 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/Chevron-TexacovEcuadorInterimAward.pdf.
76. Id.; Partial Award on the Merits in Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 128(Inv. Treaty
Arb. 2010), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0151.pdf.
77. CHEVRON, Chevron Awarded $96 Million in Arbitration Claim against the Government of
Ecuador,
Chevron
Press
Release
(Aug.
31,
2011),
available
at
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/08312011_chevronawarded96millioninarbitratio
nclaimagainstthegovernmentofecuador.news.
78. Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration in Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 152 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2009), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0155_0.pdf..
79. Id.

Cely Macro - Author Proof (Do Not Delete)

12/4/2014 7:11 PM

366

[Vol. XXIV:353

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

discrimination related to the lawsuit filed by the Lago Agrio indigenous
plaintiffs against the company in May 2003.80
In May 2010, after assembling the panel of arbitrators, the court began
deliberations and analysis of the jurisdiction of the court on the issues
raised by Chevron; on February 27, 2012, the court concluded that it had
jurisdiction over the matter.81
Since then, a number of initial hearings have taken place on the
matter, however the most recent—scheduled for January 2014—was
postponed following the presentation of the rejoinder of Ecuador to The
Hague Court and Chevron’s December 2013 filing to the Constitutional
Court of Ecuador in order to allow due process in Ecuador to be resolved.82
Throughout this process, Chevron has sought to intimidate parties to
the lawsuit as well as third parties inside and outside of the courtroom; the
company has attempted to complicate a rather simple question of taking
responsibility for unprecedented environmental damage. The oil company
has attacked the plaintiffs and their lawyers, and has gone as far as filing a
claim under the “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act”
(RICO).83
Chevron has also lobbied the US government to end key trade
programs with Ecuador such as the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug
Eradication Act (ATPDEA)84 and Ecuador’s status under the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP).85 These programs are wholly unrelated to
Chevron’s lawsuit; in fact, they have received strong bipartisan support in
the US for more than two decades because they provide licit economic
opportunities both to poor families in Ecuador who would otherwise have
no economic alternative to the drug trade, and to small business in the
United States.86 Yet, Chevron, directly and through business associations it
80. Id. at 8, 14.
81. Third Interim Award on Jur. & Admissibility in Chevron Corp. v Republic of Ecuador, Case
No. 2009-23, ,
at IV – 6 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0175.pdf.
82. Mercedes Alvaro, Tribunal Pushes Back Ecuador, Chevron Hearing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3,
2014,
6:07
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023038707045792
98942874951448 .
83. Daniel Fisher, Chevron Uses ‘Thermonuclear Device’ of RICO Against Donzinger, FORBES
(Nov. 22, 2013, 9:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/11 /22/chevron-usesthermonuclear-device-of-rico-against-donziger/.
84. M. Angeles Villarreal, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and
Issues 10 (2011).
85. Embajada Del Ecuador, ESTADOS UNIDOS, The Embassy of Ecuador in the United States
Rejects Chevron’s Campaign to Threaten Jobs and Trade with Ecuador Through the GSP (Oct. 23,
2013), http://www.ecuador.org/blog/?p=2260.
86. Id.
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supports financially, has waged a massive campaign with the goal of
coercing the Government of Ecuador to suspend due process and interfere
in the civil lawsuit between Chevron and the indigenous plaintiffs, which
they lost.
Chevron’s legal strategy is merely a tool of intimidation to avoid
complying with the judgment that ordered it to pay several billion dollars to
the plaintiffs. At the time of this writing, Chevron continues to dispute the
findings of the Ecuadorian court–the venue they fought so hard to hear and
decide this case–and continues international arbitration proceedings against
the Government of Ecuador at The Hague.87 In December 2013, an Ontario
appeals court ruled that the Lago Agrio plaintiffs could seek enforcement
of the $9.5 billion judgment in Canada where Chevron has significant
assets.88 As of April 4, 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed to hear
an appeal by Chevron of a lower court decision that said Ecuadorian
villagers could pursue in Ontario their $9.5 billion award for pollution in
the Amazon Jungle.89
V. LESSONS LEARNED
Today´s main Ecuadorian challenge resides in the transformation of its
production matrix in order to make it greener and knowledge-intensive
based. By investing in this new paradigm, the extraction of natural
resources will be done in the appropriate way and create a new standard for
attracting FDI. The challenges are not minor, and therefore the lessons
learned from the Chevron case need to be known and understood by the
international community, so it too can join Ecuador’s efforts to find
solutions to the current investor-state arbitrator system as well as to renew
the commitment to find binding human and environmental codes of
conducts for multinationals.
One of the main lessons that Ecuador learned from the Chevron case
is that the country suffered from a weak regulatory government system that
did not address in a timely matter the use of oil extraction technologies
harmful to the environment.90 There was also a lack of a conceptual

87. See, e.g., Alvaro, supra note 82.
88. Katia Dmitrieva & Liezel Hill, Canadian Court Says Ecuadoreans Can Pursue Chevron
Assets, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 17, 2013, 4:17 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news 2013-1217/canadian-court-says-ecuadoreans-can-pursue-chevron-assets.html.
89. Randall Palmer, Canada high court to hear Chevron in $9.1 billion Ecuador lawsuit,
REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2014, 2:40 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/us-chevron-ecuadorcanada-idUSBREA321SB20140403.
90. Cely, supra note 3, at 35.
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framework for evaluating investments in the natural resources sectors of
the country.91 Our current political, economic, and judicial reform
initiatives, led by President Correa, are aimed at correcting these
weaknesses.
At the present time, Ecuador is confronted with the need to bring to
conclusion two fundamental processes to make sure that our
comprehensive development policies can be implemented successfully. The
first is to improve the State’s regulatory system to build pathways that
allow further technological development, investing in human talent and
strengthening the research capacity needed to change our production and
energy matrixes.92 Ecuador has undertaken a thorough reform of higher
education and educational restructuring in order to promote the formation
of advanced human talent and the development of research, innovation, and
technology transfer.93 These efforts are spearheaded by three specialized
agencies: the Council on Higher Education, the Board of Assessment,
Accreditation and Quality Assurance of Higher Education, and the Ministry
of Education, Science, and Technology.94
The second process, just as important as the first, is that we must
accelerate and consolidate the transformation of the Ecuadorian judicial
system, redoubling efforts to achieve reforms approved in a popular
referendum in May 2011, which consisted in dissolving the standing
oversight body and replacing it with a temporary body to oversee the
restructuring of the national court system.95 As a mandatory result of this
referendum, the Government of Ecuador has undertaken the process of
transformation and reorganization of the Ecuadorian judicial system, which
strategic plan 96centers around the modernization of justice, includes:
(i) Ensuring transparency and quality in the provision of justice
91. Id. at 42.
92. Wouter Van Damme et al., A Story of Change: How Ecuador Seeks to Sustain Its
Development Agenda Through Large Scale Education Reform, UKFIET INT’L CONFERENCE ON EDUC.
& DEV.,4 (Sept. 10-12, 2013), http://www.vvob.be/vvob/files/20130830_paper-a_story_of_changehow_ecuador_seeks_to_sustain_its_development_agenda_throug h_large_scale_education_reform.pdf.
93. Id. at 14.
94. See CONSEJO DE EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR, REPÚBLICA DE ECUADOR, http://www.ces.gob.ec/
(last visited April 6, 2014).
95. Education is Essential in the Transformation of Ecuadorian Justice, Says the President of the
Judiciary, ANDES (Sept. 9, 2013, 9:36 PM), http://www.andes.info.ec/en/actualidad/ educationessential-transformation-ecuadorian-justice-says-president-judiciary.html.
96. Press Release: President of Ecuador's Judiciary Defends Independence of Justice in the
Chevron Case, CSR WIRE (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.csrwire.com/
press_releases/36433-President-of-Ecuador-s-Judiciary-Defends-Independence-of-Justice-in-theChevron-Case.
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by developing and strengthening the oral proceedings,
improving systems and alternatives to detention, and the
creation of monitoring units for hearings;
(ii) Providing optimal access to justice and fostering continuous
improvement and modernization of services through the
development and strengthening of a national mediation
system, the decentralization of justice services and the
efficiency and effectiveness of judicial proceedings;
(iii) Institutionalizing a meritocracy system in the judiciary
through establishing higher professional ethics standards.
Since 2012 when the reorganization of the judiciary began, Ecuador
has become the country in the region with the highest percentage of
investment in the judiciary in relation to the general state budget.97
Although the results of the administrative reorganization of the judicial
system obtained so far are encouraging, true systemic changes will take
time and much remains to be done. Through this process, Ecuador hopes to
have a professional and technical judiciary.
By implementing these reforms, Ecuador seeks to provide an
attractive environment for international investment that respects all of our
principles as well as fair economic aspirations. However, Ecuador cannot
and should not pave the way to fuller promotion of sustainability and
corporate responsibility alone. This obligation falls to the entire
international community because the air we breathe, the water we drink,
and the nature that gives us life knows no borders.
On the international level, there is growing recognition that
responsible and sustainable development is a human right. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) asserts that:
The process of globalization and other global developments over the
past decades have seen non-state actors such as transnational
corporations and other businesses play an increasingly important role
internationally, but also at the national and local levels. The growing
reach and impact of business enterprises have given rise to a debate
about the roles and responsibilities of such actors with regard to human
rights. International human rights standards have traditionally been the
responsibility of governments, aimed at regulating relations between the
State and individuals and groups. But with the increased role of
corporate actors, nationally and internationally, the issue of business’
97. Id.
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impact on the enjoyment of human rights has been placed on the agenda
of the United Nations. Over the past decade, the United Nations human
rights machinery has been considering the scope of business’ human
rights responsibilities and exploring ways for corporate actors to be
accountable for the impact of their activities on human rights.98

In its Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,99 the
UNHCR also recognizes the role of corporations in the protection of human
rights, including consideration of potential adverse affects that their
practices could have on communities where they operate. This principle
most assuredly applies to oil companies whose exploration and exploitation
of hydrocarbons pose huge risks for pollution and environmental damage.
As in the case of Texaco’s 25-year operation in Ecuador, this is especially
relevant, and Ecuador, in partnership with the international community,
must see that these obligations are finally fulfilled.
Through this process, Ecuador has also learned that Bilateral
Investment Treaties, and the arbitration framework around them, must be
reformed. BITs have received much criticism and have caused controversy
in international investment disputes because nations increasingly find
themselves facing million-dollar lawsuits under an arbitration system that is
excessively costly, minimally transparent in its decisions, and overreaching in its interpretations of these agreements’ provisions.100
There are many recommendations for reforming and strengthening the
arbitration system. A few key recommendations are outlined below101:
(i)

Selecting arbitrators through a transparent process that
guarantees that they can only serve as jurors and not also act
as legal representatives for companies who have cases before
the arbitration system;
(ii) Establishing an institutional mechanism within the
arbitration system that allows parties to effectively appeal
awards; and
98. Business and Human Rights: Overview, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Business Index.aspx (last visited Feb.
23, 2014 ).
99. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the UN “Protect, Respect
and Remedy” Framework 13, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciples BusinessHR_EN.pdf.
100. World Investment Report 2012: Towards A New Generation of Inv. Policies 86, UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (2012), http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTADWIR2012-Full-en.pdf.
101. Cely, supra note 3, at 40.
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(iii) Requiring that all local remedies be exhausted before
entering the arbitration system.
These reforms are not only necessary to strengthen our investment
environment, but are required as part of Ecuador’s commitment to
strengthen democracy and the protection of human rights. In fact, as a
result of the reforms instituted in the new constitution, Ecuador is obligated
to renegotiate or terminate if necessary its bilateral investment treaties.102
Ecuador believes that balancing its principles and treaty obligations is
ultimately possible and demonstrated this commitment in late 2013 when it
presented the Joint Declaration on Transnational Corporations and Human
Rights before the 24th Ordinary Session of the Human Rights Council of
the United Nations.103 The Declaration, signed by 85 countries, seeks to
create binding international law to ensure that the powers of transnational
companies are subject to the scrutiny of monitoring and promoting human
rights in the countries where they do business.104 This first step represents
significant progress to establish minimal standards of corporate ethics for
transnational investors and respect for human rights, which signatory states
are obligated to protect.
The Government of Ecuador fully supports the principle that all
investment risk should be properly rewarded. But, under the current BIT
system, conditions indiscriminately favor corporate and commercial
interests over human rights, rights of nature, and countries’ sovereignty.
Countries like Ecuador must balance these commercial interests with public
policy objectives that seek to protect all the principles that must be
upheld—for investors as well as for citizens who should benefit from this
economic investment.
On a global level, criticism of the state-investor dispute system is
rapidly increasing. This criticism is largely due to investors who often
abuse these arbitration systems, either asserting that governments violated
the BITs because public policies have threatened their revenues, or by
claiming that they were unfairly and inequitably treated when due process
102. Ecuador Establishes Commission to Audit Its Bilateral Inv. Treaties, ALLEN & OVERY (Nov.
13, 2013), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Ecuador-establishes-Commission-toaudit-its-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties.aspx.
103. Ecuador Leads Declaration About the Needs of an Int’l Judicial Instrument About
Transnational Businesses & Human Rights, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & HUMAN MOBILITY OF
THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR (Sept. 16, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://cancilleria.gob.ec/ecuador-leadsdeclaration-about-the-needs-of-an-international-judicial-instrument-about-transnational-businesses-andhuman-rights/?lang=en.
104. Brid Brennan, Insights into the Power of Corporations, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE (Jan. 23,
2014), http://www.tni.org/article/state-corporate-power.
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did not find in their favor. More and more, the international community,
including the United States, realizes that this broken arbitration system
weakens the sovereign right of countries to conceive and implement public
policies aimed at improving health, the environment, and other social
protections for their citizens. As Lise Johnson, Senior Legal Researcher at
the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, noted
regarding the United States’ own recent reevaluation of its BITs, “The
rather few changes that have been made [to the US BIT model text] appear
to reflect efforts to address concerns triggered by relatively recent
developments such as the growth of investment into and from China and
the global financial crisis, as well as more persistent issues regarding
whether and how to reconcile investment treaties with national and
international policies on environmental and labor standards.”105
In order to reform these arbitration systems, key capital-exporting
countries in the global economy, such as the US, China, and EU member
states, must demonstrate the necessary political will to establish a
multilateral framework through organizations such as the UN, where
debate can take place to create minimum standards and protection
necessary (due to the asymmetry of power) for small countries to benefit
from an effective renegotiation of bilateral investment treaties. It is only
through this multilateral dialogue that the central problems of lack of
transparency and conflicts of interest can be debated and clear parameters
can be established in order to prevent the unrealistic and unfounded
interpretations made by these arbitration tribunals.
Without an agreement on these minimum standards and protections, it
is unlikely that there will be significant progress in achieving a balance
between protecting the rights of investors and the regulatory capacity of
States.
CONCLUSION
Ecuador has charted a difficult course, but one that is necessary and
mindful of the complexity of our goals—building our country, economy,
and investment environment and elevating the lives of our citizens—all
while holding as equally important our duty to be the best stewards we can
of the earth and the space we have been given. We intend to prove through
our example that profitable and responsible are not mutually exclusive and
105. Lise Johnson, The 2012 US Model BIT and What the Changes (or Lack
Thereof) Suggest about Future Investment Treaties, Pol. Risk Ins. News Letter (Volume III, Issue 2,
November 2012), available at http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/content/Political_Risk
_Insurance_Newsletter_-_The_2012_US_Model_BIT_-_Nov_2012.pdf.
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the first fruits of these efforts are beginning to show.
It is regrettable that extraneous and unnecessary actions taken by
Chevron, from using every judicial maneuver imaginable to waging a PR
and lobbying campaign against the plaintiffs, Ecuador, and all who seek
justice, have overshadowed the only real issue that matters: Chevron’s
irresponsible drilling practices caused devastating damage to one of our
planet’s most biodiverse areas. It is far past time for the oil company to
rectify the harm that it has caused.
Furthermore, the hard lessons we learned in Ecuador must not be
forgotten; they are instructive to countries in every region of the world. As
globalization shortens the distance between countries and corporations and
as we come to the realization that 20th century progress has taken a toll on
our planet, it is time we all evaluate what worked and what did not. We
must move forward with a commitment and with a regulatory and legal
framework suited for 21st century progress. The international community,
members large and small, must change the way that corporate social
responsibility is measured. It must include provisions that value human
rights and environmental protections equally with profits or that measure
will remain flawed. Those who do not learn from history will be doomed to
repeat it and we, Ecuador working with the international community,
cannot let this come to pass.

